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LITERATURE AND CRITICISM 
In these days of "scientific method," when there is so little 
literary activity of a genuinely critical sort, it is a good deal 
easier to say in what such activity does not, than in what it does} 
consist. That literary criticism is not identical with a study of 
words or language, or yet of texts or "documents"; that it is 
not to be confounded with philology or with the exploration of 
origins or derivations, or the investigation of manuscripts, or a 
determination of the details of literary history-all this ought. 
to be reasonably clear on the face of it, and when stated in so 
many words, would probably be conceded even by those who 
have done most to cause the present confusion. That such sub-
jects and pursuits are very interesting, very important in the¥ 
way, there is no gainsaying. The study of etymology alone has 
been of great, if indirect, assistance in the comprehension of 
literature, although to an hundred etymologists there is probabl1 
no more than one good critic. But still literature is something 
more than words and lives with another life than theirs; they 
are but the appurtenances, and neither phonology nor phonetics 
will ever furnish the basis for a satisfactory criticism of literature, 
any more than a chemistry of pigments will suffice for a criticism 
of painting. 
Nor is this general statement less applicable to the study of 
"literary" than of linguistic sources, rudiments, and develop-
ments, however useful the former, like the latter, to the indirect 
appreciation of literature. Unfortunately it is only too easy to 
overrate the importance of primitive and dialectic "literature"-
of "communal poetry," for example, or the early Germanic 
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"epic"; or rather, to rate them in inappropriate and misleading 
terms. Even the name literature in such a connection must be 
taken in a cautious and qualified way; since it is just the want of 
a term to distinguish the "documentary" from the literary, 
which has confirmed, if it has not induced, the current mis-
apprehension. That a piece of writing may have a'relative or 
historical value without any absolute or literary value, is any-
thing but an uncommon occurrence; indeed, most writing is of 
this kind. On the contrary, it happens only too often that this 
tentative and rudimentary "literature," these gropings and 
strayings of an immature or defective culture, which we are 
naively expected to admire nowadays, are perfectly indifferent 
to criticism-that is, to a better sense of the permanent signifi.., 
cance of life, and are of interest solely to scholarship-that is, 
to a knowledge and reconstruction of the past. For such, after 
all, is essentially the difference between the functions of scholar-
ship and of cri~icism: the former seeks to determine the fact; 
the latter, to interpret it. While scholarship endeavours to 
reconstitute the past in its habit as it lived; criticism attempts to 
liberate the idea, to set free the message it has to communicate. 
In this sense scholarship is "scientific," if one likes the word; it 
deals with facts, with the thing itself; it is impersonal and in its 
own manner final. Its results, when once obtained, are definitive 
and are taken up into the common stock of information, though 
their original form and method may be superseded and forgotten. 
On the other hand, criticism, as an affair of ideas, is necessarily 
individual and relative; for although literature is itself essentially 
in the nature of a permanent contribution to human experience, 
its application will vary from one generation to another and_ its 
interpretation will change with the age--to say nothing of the 
farther circumstance that its meaning is always exposed to a 
personal reaction. How close the connection, then, between 
scholarship and criticism, is at once apparent. But though it is 
perhaps no wonder under the circumstances that the two offices 
of verification and interpretation should be confounded-par-
ticularly in view of the unwarrantable extension which has been 
given of late years to the province of philology; yet the two are, 
in reality, distinct, and the integrity of our thought requires that 
they should be kept so. 
In this way the remains of Gothic, consisting of a few biblical 
translations and a legal instrument or two, constituted an 
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historical find of some importance since they served to fill a gap 
in our knowledge of the Germanic dialects; but as literature they 
are naught, and may be neglected by a sound criticism without 
our suffering the slightest intellectual inconvenience or the 
smallest arrest of moral growth. Even Beowulf itself, that 
venerable monument of Teutonic ingenuousness, is, I believe, 
more interesting as history than as literature, though treated 
with exaggerated respect by our modem philological scholarship. 
At all events it ought to be spoken of in other and more moderate 
terms than its admirers commonly use of it, as though it were in 
any sense comparable with the Iliad or the OtLyssey. "Scientifi-
cally" they are both, no doubt, "the products of a barbaric 
jj culture"; but the inability to feel thei~ moral incommensura-
bility is in itself a sufficient critical disqualification for speaking 
of them at all. To the scholar, to the student, even to the critic 
himself, an acquaintance with these imperfect expressions of the 
human spirit is valuable, it must be confessed, after a fashion-
as valuable as a familiarity with the history of his institutions to 
the statesman. But in the same manner that the one sort of 
knowledge is not statesmanship, so the other is not criticism. 
The critic should be thankful for every scrap of information, no 
matter how scanty or hardly gained, toward a better under-
standing of things as they are, of which not the least useful is 
that which informs him how they came to be so; but the means 
nlust not be mistaken for the end-a grasp of the facts for a 
comprehension of ideas. It is all very well to know the recipe 
of the pudding; but if we are to avoid mental bewilderment-and 
that is perhaps as much as we can expect to do in a world where 
truth is largely a matter of convention-we must remember 
that its enjoyment is quite another thing and requires for its 
expression an entirely different set of terms. 
On the other hand, just as it is necessary to guard against 
mistaking philological or historical, for literary, inquiry; so too 
it is equally necessary, in· the interests of intellectual clearness,. 
to beware of a like confusion between criticism and some in-
genious analogy or illustration of the" natural" sciences. That 
the course of literary development furnishes a suggestive example 
of the principles of organic evolution, is undeniable. But un-
deniably too, though so serious a mind as Brunetiere has failed 
to see it, the illustration is biological, not critical. And in like 
manner as Brunetiere delights to recognise in literature the 
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familiar phenomena of the differentiation and modification of 
genres, the growth and transformation and degeneration of 
species, we may too, if we please, exercise our ingenuity in trying 
. to show how Dickens's novels grew out of the work which pre-
ceded him and how they mingle the romance of Fielding with the 
sentimentality and realism of Richardson. But after all that is 
not what we read Dickens for-if, indeed, amid the constant 
solicitations of modern scholarship we have sufficient literary 
virtue left to read him at all. Or again, we may amuse ourselves 
in thinking to surprise the origin of the English novel as a whole 
in a kind of cross, such as Brunetiere has so much to say about, 
between the comedy of manners and the social essay, such as 
Addison wrote, cleverly deducing from the former its turn for 
modem detail and from the latter its moral seriousness. But to 
say nothing of the fact that such transitions or transformations 
are in themselves quite unintelligible and explain nothing, this 
sort of thing yields no just sense of the tragic import of a Clarissa 
Harlowe. 
And the case is no better with the" psychological" interpreta-
tion of literature than with the "physiological." To be sure, i 
work of genius is, in a manner, a psychological product as, in· 
another, it is a physiological one. But while such a scientific 
study of genius, as it is pleasantly called, may throw a good -d~al . 
of light upon the processes of composition and may even es~ab-. 
lish a kind of extrinsic mechanical order among the phenomena 
of literature, it fails dismally to express its essence or spirit; 'and 
leaving such a residuum, it can not be properly· reckoned as 
criticism. For though literature is to some extent a physical and 
psychological product, it is to a much greater extent a moral one, 
of which in the exact sense of words there is no science possible. 
It is an affair of principle, not of law. What are known nowadays, 
ridiculously enough, as the moral sciences have to do, as far as 
th.;y are capable of exact formulation, not with the moral order 
proper, but only with certain physical manifestations or accom-
paniments of the moral nature. In other respects they are purely 
descriptive and hence essentially literary in character. How 
much of the effect of Professor James's Psychology, for instance, 
depends upon the dexterity of his phrasing! And how much of 
the contents of any modern psychology consists of ordinary 
commonplaces done over into a kind of special jargon or cant-a 
sort of perverted rhetorical exercise, a misty intellectual algebra! 
LITERATURE AND CRITICISM 
For this reason it fares little better with the sociological criti-
cism represented by Hennequin and in a modified and milder 
dose by Leslie Stephen. To Hennequin's mind and to some less 
extent to Leslie Stephen's also, literature is merely a form or mode 
of social expression, in which society, working through the 
individual author, records its own psychology at a particular 
moment or period of its history, so that criticism becomes a kind 
of Volkspsychologie, as the Germans call it, and the author him-
self a mere transmitter or mouthpiece. In measure, of course, 
the contention is correct. In some manner a book is undoubtedly 
the outcome of a certain society and may be explained to some 
degree in function of the society contemporaneous with it. Such 
was Taille's idea, which, narrow and inelastic as it was, was at 
least more liberal than the dogmas of most of his successors. At 
best, however, society is but the condition, and, like all con-
ditions, does not originate but influences. To say nothing of the 
merely empirical objection that it is often the author who is, 
in all seeming, the first to divine and rescue truth and is fre-
quently obliged to impose himself upon his audience if he would 
be heard at all, so that he appears rather to form his public than 
to be formed by it-it is evident, in addition, that a work of 
li tera ture in the strict sense of the word is something exceptional 
by its very nature. It is the difference-or as we still say, rather 
condescendingly, the genius-which gives the book its value. It 
is not the newspapers which constitute the literature of a period. 
Mere unison, what everybody is saying, as· well as imitation, 
reproduction, repetition, fail to count. "There is nothing in the. 
drama of Rotrou, " says Brunetiere, "which is not to be found in 
that of Corneille; if the work of the former did not exist, there 
would be nothing lacking to the history of our theatre ... ~nd 
that is why his tragi-comedies may interest a few of the curious, 
but have not a place in the history of French literature." Only 
the contribution, the distinctively personal vision, is of any 
permanent importance-and it is the work of permanent impor-
tance alone which is properly literature, since literature is ob-
viously literature by virtue of its message to us who read it and 
not by virtue of its expression of local and temporal peculiarities. 
Pope is still poetry, not because he voices the ideals of Anne-it 
is just in as far as he follows the fashion of his day that he has 
been repudiated-but because he voices certain ideas that 
humanity would not willingly forego: 
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II And sure, if aught below the seats divine" 
Can touch immortals, 'tis a soul like thine, 
A soul supreme in each hard instance tried 
Above all pain, all anger, and all pride, 
The rage of power, the blast of public breath, 
The lust of lucre, and the dread of death." 
It is sentiments like these, the sense of human dignity, that still 
constitute Pope a poet, not the Dunciad; while, on the other hand, 
Addison, the image of his time, is only less of a classic by that 
very fact. 
Of this theory Paul Albert, himself one of its more unsyste-
matic advocates, has such an amusingly inadvertent refutation 
that I can not refrain from quoting it. "Before all, " he says of 
criticism, II the first thing to seek in a work is what makes its life, 
what is the soul of it. But how to discover this without replac-
ing the work in the milieu where it was produced, without 
reconstructing the religious, social, and political life of the people 
who saw it born? It is because the work was in intimate harmony 
with the society for which if was made that it is thought beauti-
ful." Very well. But in another moment, when brought face to 
face with the reality, how easily and unconsciously he relin-
quishes a contention untenable in fact! A propos of Moliere he 
declares that" genuine art is a happy mixture of the particular 
and the general, of the real and the ideal. By many traits of 
detail Harpagon and Tartufe properly belong to the seventeenth 
century; the total of their physiognomy consists, however, of 
types of all times and all countries." Precisely so. That is the 
distinction to which the "sociologist" himself is finally driven 
between great literature and small-its relative persistency. It 
is still literature by its appeal for us who read it, not by its 
appeal for those who read it in the past. Indisputably Sophocles 
is an Athenian as Shakespeare is an Elizabethan; and their plays 
are full of local and temporal allusions and insinuations that we 
nowadays find it difficult or even impossible to understand or 
detect-for it is extremely doubtful whether we ever see in the 
past, with all the assistance that scholarship can give, just what 
was seen by its contemporaries; so that if Sophocles and Shake-
speare were nothing more than Athenian and Elizabethan, they 
would not be literature. While on the other hand it is more than 
probable that we have come to. admire them' for many' a quality 
which their own generation and indeed they themselves never 
. . 
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suspected. For it is only as they yield a meaning or significance 
for posterity, as they assist their successors to a better compre-
hension of life, that they continue to be literature. They are 
literature only as they are explicable, not in terms of some other 
subject or interest, but Jmmediately and for themselves, and as 
they have succeeded in surviving the society in which they arose, 
while their literary characteristics are those which remain when 
the peculiarities of such a society are abstracted. Even Taine 
himself is compelled in the end to grade the arts in accordance 
with the duration of the fashions which they commemorate. In 
a word, literature is literature by virtue of some exceptional and 
permanent significance; any discussion which fails to bring out 
this appeal or which, i~stead of bringing it out, substitutes other 
concerns, such as philology or evolution or psychology or sociol-
ogy, is irrelevant from the point of view of criticism. I do not 
say that such a discussion may not be fruitful-that it may not 
assist us in understanding Sophocles's significance or Shake-
speare's; but the main thing critically is that significance, and 
whatever is not concerned immediately with that significance, is 
not criticism. 
In a sort, no doubt, the biographical criticism, so much af-
fected by Sainte-Beuve, is in much the same case. To be sure, 
a study of the author's life comes nearer to the springs of his 
inspiration than does any of the other studies that I have men-
tioned. But all the same the impertinence, though more subtle, 
is still impertinence. In any case what gives the writer his sole 
interest for criticism is his book. If he happens to be more 
remarkable as a character, he belongs on that side to history, not 
literature. Otherwise, the light by which he shines is reflected 
and has its source in his writing, where it may best be sought, 
not in his life. I am tempted even to say that a book which 
requires a knowledge of its maker for its enjoyment is necessarily 
of an inferior order. It is no particular recommendation that so 
much of Swift's work begins and ends with Swift. Even Goethe 
himself is open, in many instances, to the same reproach; to some 
extent he has allowed himself to become subdued to the tyranny 
of his own being. But then Goethe is by all odds a more signifi-
cant figure as a human being than as an artist. An intimate 
acquaintance with the personal peculiarities and doings of 
authors is recognised, and correctly so, as the property of the 
special student rather than of the general or cultivated reader. 
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There is felt to be something technical and professional about it. 
To think otherwise is to confound literature with life. The hero, 
the statesman-and the poet too, it may be-belong in part to' 
the world, whose recorder and critic is. the historian; the poem 
alone belongs to literature. And while it is well that the literary 
critic, zealous of every side-light, should know his man too, yet. 
his task is largely a special one and requires an amount of scaf-
folding quite incommensurate with the size of his edifice whe~ 
finished. And so it is-to put a term to my enormity at once-
that in reading Sainte-Beuve I am filled with impatience at the 
frequent obtrusion of the writer's private preoccupations and the 
constant exhibition of the critic's workshop. 
At the same time I would not go to the other extreme, as many 
do, and because literature can not be wholly contained by an 
exact terminology, protest that criticism is nothing more than 
an account of the manner in which a book happens to strike us 
individually. In this view-the view of Anatole France and 
Walter Pater-the taste for literature is entirely an affair of 
personal liking; criticism is altogether capricious, illogical, and 
unreasonable-a story of adventure in a library. The only thing 
that can be said with certainty about a piece of writing is that 
we do or do not care for it. But not only is this impressionism 
as erroneous as any of the other conceptions of which I have 
spoken, it is, if anything, more vicious because it is more licen-
tious and unprincipled. For even though literature is not 
amenable to scientific formulation, it does not follow by any 
means that criticism is wanton and unscrupulous. Life, for 
instance, eludes as a whole the symmetrical categories of science 
for the reason that it belongs in large part to another order-to-
the moral, not to the physical, order with which science deals. 
And yet the irreducible discriminations of the individual con-
sciousness are subject after a fashion to principle though not to 
law-so much so that there is nothing more contemptuous than 
to call a man unprincipled. At all events, though our actions 
may be unprognosticable, we are able at least to give them some 
kind of consistency, to justify or excuse them on general con-
siderations after the fact. But our impression of a book is, after 
all, only a portion of our mental life, as the book itself is of its 
author's, and is naturally constituted in the same manner as the 
rest of the experience to which it belongs. While literature, . 
further, is a: representation or more broadly ~ treatment of life 
{ . 
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as a whole and consists of the various conceptions' or visions or 
interpretations, not of the life of a particular time or age exclu-
sively, but of the life of humanity at large, including not merely 
its active or objective life-its manners, customs, and usages-
but also its inner or conscious life-its thought, emotion, and 
reflection; and its author's merit is measured by the value which 
his view of these matters has for the race. Is his view of life 
conformable with moral experience, is it elevated and sustaining, 
does it help to free us from the tyranny of appearance and of the 
phenomenal, does it aid us to bear misfortune and prosperity, 
injustice and flattery, does it strengthen and confirm our spirit 
. and save us from ourselves; then it is good literature and a per-
manent contribution to human culture. For however it may be 
with the physical world with which science undertakes to deal-
whetherits order be inherent or imputed; ithas been necessary at all 
events for man to organize for himself the moral world,' the world 
in which he lives the most. The knowledge of himself and of his 
proper aim and activity, the distinction between the human and 
the brute, the se~].se of a social nature, of principle and duty, of 
right and wrong,' even the feeling for seemliness and beauty-all 
these acquirements have been the result of a long and uncertain 
development, the contribution of many hands. To be sure, there 
is confusion enough as it is. But these acquisitions of the human 
spirit, these partial dispersals of chaos, have been confirmed and 
perpetuated by literature, which, even if it has not created the 
moral illusion, has given it form and currency. 
It is for this reason that any serious discussion of literature 
should have to do, first of all, with the conception of life included 
in the work-not with life alone, for literature is not life itself 
but its reflection in a consciousness essentially moral; and not the 
book alone, for the book is merely the record of a reflection-but 
with the relation between the two, or, in other words, with the 
attitude of literature to life. Should this relation be broad and 
general, as in the case of an entire national literature like the 
Greek, or, rather more restrictedly, of some large literary move-
ment like German romanticism; then the criticism will be broad 
and general too and will aim to show the manner in which this 
national literature as a whole or this literary movement as a 
whole has confronted the problem of existence. Or the relation 
may be narrow and particular or even individual, as in the case 
of a single author like Shakespeare; and under these circum-
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stances the criticism, adapting itself to t~e subject, will become 
individual too and will have to show what Shake!?peare answered 
to the most pressing questions which life proposes. Naturally 
such a criticism will not expect of literature a replica or pastiche 
of actuality. It will look rather for the harmonious adjustments 
of the human spirit, the establishment of a rhythmic conscious 
order among the promiscuous elements of experience. And in so 
doing it will have no hesitation in calling in assistance from any 
department of investigation that is likely to throw a light upon 
the matter-whether physiological, psychological, sociological, 
or what not; though it will try to avoid mistaking such answers 
as it may get from these sources for answers to its principal 
inquiry. And inasmuch as the life which is both the subject 
and object of literature, is neither scientific nor yet unprincipled 
but broadly moral; our criticism will be neither scientific nor 
impressionistic, but will consist in a free play of the intelligence 
just as life does. It will be based on general principles, which, 
though elastic, are broader than the observation of a single case, 
and which are capable of being explained and justified, as our 
conduct is, rationally and intelligibly, if nothing more. 
Now if these considerations are just, though only in a limited 
and partial measure, it would seem to be high time that criticism 
were busying itself with the foundations of such a study-or 
were at least establishing certain comm..on grounds or postulates 
to which its conclusions might be referred with the effect of 
ending all critical divergencies or at least of justifying their 
existence. In comparison with the age and the pretensions of 
the subject is it not astounding that there is yet so little sub-
stantial agreement with regard to the significance and rationale 
of the simplest literary phenomena? To all appearance it is still 
impossible for any two critics to agree as to the proper relation' 
in general of literature to life, as it is to appeal to any accepted 
canon by way of settling their disputes. One opinion proceeds 
on the assumption that literature and life are or should be 
identical; another, that they are diverse, though without ventur-
ing to define the difference. Of the former party, one assumes 
that it is the closeness of the imitation that makes literature; 
another, that it is the technical skill, the trick of style, the 
verbal coquetry of the rendering. Of a stanza of Browning's 
Lovers' Quarrel, which retails the heroine's costume, Mr. Chester-
ton observes that it "would almost serve as an order to a dress-
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maker and is therefore poetry," while a reviewer cites the remark 
as an amusing illustration of Mr. Chesterton's ignorance of the 
very nature of poetry. But Mr. Chesterton is either right or 
wrong. If he is wrong, there should be some way of bringing 
him to terms. If he is right, there should be some way of silen-
cing his detractors. It is scandalous that at this time of day a 
man may make any statement about the rudiments of literature 
without fear of shame or ridicule. Is there another subject of 
consequence in which such recklessness would be tolerated, much 
more applauded as though it were an admired qualification in 
an authority? 
And yet this is a problem which lies at the very roots of 
criticism; for how is it possible to determine the merits or even 
the character of a piece of work while the aim and intention of its 
existence. are uncertain? How can we form an opinion about a 
literary product before we know what literature in general ought 
to do--or at all events what it actually has done? Nor is the 
problem insoluble, much as the factiousness of modern criticism 
may have embroiled it. At least there ought to be comparatively 
little difficulty in stating it fairly, even though it may not be 
possible all at once to reconcile individual prejudices or prefer-
ences for one literary position rather than another. Community 
of opinion in all such matters is, like every work of construction, 
an affair of slow and laborious cultivation. Right reason gradu-
ally prevails; a canon finally develops. But it must be preceded 
by copious discussion, by a clear recognition and exhibition from 
every side of all the facts in their proper character. 
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